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In spite of the general prohibition of intervention in the affairs of other states, military 
interventions undertaken with the consent of a host state are considered to be permissible. 
This is confirmed both in state practice and in international legal doctrine. However, in 
order for such interventions to be permitted in particular situations, certain requirements 
have to be fulfilled. The consent must be given by a due authority, it must not be vitiated, 
it must precede the intervention, and it must be given expressly and clearly. This article 
explores the meaning of each of these requirements and examines their application in 
state practice. In addition, the possibility of intervening in civil wars is examined. It is 
submitted, in the conclusion of the article, that some aspects of the right to intervene 
upon invitation are undergoing certain changes, which results in the non-intervention 
principle becoming more flexible.
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Introduction
Much has been written on self-defense and actions authorized by the u.N. security 
Council as the only exceptions to the use of force provided for by the Charter of the 
united Nations. As much as the particular aspects of these two exceptions, primarily 
self-defense, are far from unambiguous, their legality is not disputed. the same 
cannot be said about a whole range of military interventions which regularly take 
place among states. Besides humanitarian interventions, which nowadays no doubt 
represent one of the most controversial issues, in recent years much attention has 
been drawn to another type of military intervention – interventions by invitation, or, 
as some authors prefer to call them, consensual interventions.1
intervention by invitation, as defined by the international Law institute, is direct 
military assistance by the sending of armed forces by one state to another state upon 
1  eliav Lieblich, International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent 1 (New york: routledge, 
2013). hafner also criticizes the term “intervention by invitation” and proposes the term “military 
assistance on request.” See Gerhard hafner (rapporteur), Problèmes actuels du recours à la force en 
droit international. Sous-groupe : Intervention sur invitation [Present Problems of the Use of Force in 
International Law. Sub-Group: Intervention by Invitation] in Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international : 
Session de Naples (Italie), Vol. 73, 2009 [Yearbook of the Institute of International Law: Session of Napoli 
(Italy), Vol. 73, 2009] 299 (Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 2009) (Nov. 2, 2019), also available at http://www.
idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/hafner.pdf. some authors use the terms “consent” and “invitation to 
intervene” interchangeably, treating them as synonyms. See Max Byrne, Consent and the Use of Force: An 
Examination of “Intervention by Invitation” as a Basis for Us Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, 
3(1) Journal on the use of Force and international Law 97, 97 (2016). the author of the present paper 
will follow the same line of reasoning, using the terms “intervention by invitation,” “invited intervention,” 
“consent-based intervention” and “consensual intervention” interchangeably.
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the latter’s request.2 the argument of “invitation” or “consent” has been invoked on 
number of occasions. in recent years it has, for instance, been invoked to justify French 
intervention in Mali, u.s. drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, somalia and yemen, 
saudi Arabia’s intervention in yemen, russia’s intervention in ukraine, interventions 
against islamic state of iraq and the Levant (isiL) in iraq, Libya and syria, as well as 
numerous interventions among African states.3 these examples, along with many 
others that took place in the second half of the 20th century, show that interventions 
by invitation appear relatively often and, therefore, deserve closer scrutiny.
it is a well-established rule of international law that intervention in the affairs of 
another state is prohibited. the declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the 
domestic Affairs of states and the Protection of their independence and sovereignty 
provides that “no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.”4 An identical provision 
was stipulated in the Friendly relations declaration,5 as well as in the declaration 
on inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal Affairs of states.6 
Furthermore, the iCJ observed in the Nicaragua case that a prohibited intervention 
is one “bearing on matters in which each state is permitted, by the principle of state 
sovereignty, to decide freely.”7 One such matter is “the choice of a political, economic, 
social and cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy.”8 the Court further 
noted that a wrongful intervention is one that “uses methods of coercion in regard to 
such choices, which must remain free ones.”9 Coercion is “particularly obvious in the 
case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, 
or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within 
another state.”10
2  Gerhard hafner (rapporteur), Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law. Sub-Group C – 
Military Assistance on Request, institute of international Law, session of rhodes (Greece), 10th Com- 
mission, Plenary, 8 september 2011 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/ 
2017/06/2011_rhodes_10_C_en.pdf.
3  For instance, the ugandan intervention in south sudan in 2013, or the economic Community of west 
African states (eCOwAs) intervention in Gambia in 2017.
4  u.N. General Assembly, declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic Affairs of states 
and the Protection of their independence and sovereignty, 21 december 1965, A/res/2131(XX).
5  u.N. General Assembly, declaration on Principles of international Law Concerning Friendly relations 
and Co-Operation Among states in Accordance with the Charter of the united Nations, 24 October 
1970, A/res/2625(XXv).
6  u.N. General Assembly, declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the 
internal Affairs of states, 9 december 1981, A/res/36/103.
7  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 





in spite of the generally accepted prohibition of intervention, practically no one 
contests that interventions which are conducted upon invitation are permissible, 
provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. therefore, the controversy over this 
type of intervention does not lie in the permissibility of the undertaking per se, but in 
the fulfillment of certain requirements necessary for its legality. these controversies 
mainly concern determining the due authority to request outside intervention. 
is a government of a state the only entity authorized to invite a foreign intervention, 
or may opposition groups, under certain circumstances, also be empowered to do 
so? is any government entitled to request outside military assistance? Must it have 
democratic legitimacy? Must it have a certain degree of control over a territory, 
and if so, what degree? what if both sides to the conflict control significant parts of 
a territory? Are invited interventions allowed in cases in which the hostilities within 
a country have evolved into a civil war? these and other questions will be addressed 
in the following chapters.
1. Consent as a Legal Basis for Intervention
since neither the u.N. Charter, nor any other international document, specifically 
regulates interventions by invitation, the starting point of our analysis will be 
Article 20 of the iLC draft Articles on responsibility of states for internationally 
wrongful Acts (dArs), which speaks of consent. Article 20 reads:
valid consent by a state to the commission of a given act by another state 
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former state to the 
extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.11
Consent is, therefore, specified as one of the circumstances precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act, which act would, in the absence of such consent, be illegal. 
such preclusion is conditional upon two things: first, that the consent is “valid,” 
and second, that the act in question remains within the limits of that consent. we 
will consider both conditions later on. But before we move on to elaborating the 
prerequisites for valid consent, another issue must be addressed. it concerns the 
possibility of invoking consent in relation to military interventions, given the fact 
that consent cannot justify a breach of a peremptory norm of international law.
1.1. Consent and the Use of Force
Consent, as well as other circumstances precluding wrongfulness as outlined in 
dArs, may be invoked only if actions undertaken under these circumstances are 
11  united Nations, draft Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries (2001) (Nov. 2, 2019), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
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in conformity with the peremptory norms of international law.12 this is required by 
Article 26 of dArs.13 since the prohibition of the use of force has commonly been 
accepted as a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens),14 the question of the 
permissibility of invoking consent in relation to the use of force, or more specifically 
to invited military interventions, has become an issue.
if a military intervention is a form of the use of force and the prohibition of force is 
a peremptory norm, consent could not then be a valid ground for precluding wrong-
fulness in a military intervention. Following this line of reasoning, consent could not 
serve as a legal basis for a military intervention.
however, this argument corresponds neither to scholarly writing,15 nor to state prac-
tice,16 which both show that interventions by invitation have generally been accepted 
as permissible. even the iCJ has confirmed the right of states to seek outside military 
assistance.17 On what grounds then could such interventions be justified?
12  A peremptory norm is defined in the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (vCLt) as “a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.” vienna Convention on the Law of treaties (with Annex), concluded 
at vienna on 23 May 1969 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/
volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf. A definition of a peremptory norm from the vCLt 
has been used for the purposes of state responsibility in dArs.
13  Article 26 of dArs provides that “nothing ... precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a state which is 
not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.” 
For the text of dArs see supra note 11.
14  the international Law Commission pointed out that “the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition 
of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the 
character of jus cogens.” See draft Articles on the Law of treaties with Commentaries (1966), at 247 (Nov. 2, 
2019), available at https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf. See 
also Nicaragua case, supra note 7, para. 190. Although there is a fairly unanimous understanding that 
prohibition of force represents a jus cogens norm, it remains much less clear whether the peremptory 
character refers to each and every form of the use of force or whether it is reserved for the most serious 
instances of the use of force, such as aggression. scholarly opinion is not clear on this point. Natalino 
ronzitti, Use of Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent in The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 
147, 159 (A. Cassese (ed.), dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986).
15  Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 85 (Oxford; New york: Oxford university Press, 2008); 
Olivier Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law (Oxford: hart Publishing, 2010); Gregory h. Fox, Intervention by Invitation in The Oxford Handbook 
of the Use of Force in International Law 816 (M. weller (ed.), Oxford; New york: Oxford university Press, 
2015).
16  See, for instance, Australian Prime Minister’s statement on the request by the iraqi Government for help 
in fighting isiL, PM transcripts, 12 July 2015 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/
prime-minister/abbott-tony?page=65; statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, keeping 
tabs on Canada’s Parliament, 6 October 2014 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://openparliament.ca/
debates/2014/10/6/john-baird-5/; stephen w. Preston, Speech on the Legal Framework for the United 
States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11, u.s. department of defense, 10 April 2015 (Nov. 2, 2019), available 
at https://dod.defense.gov/News/speeches/speech-view/Article/606662/the-legal-/.
17  See infra note 64.
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it can reasonably be presumed that anything that a state consents to cannot be 
considered as being against that state. where there is consent, there is no coercion.18 
this reasoning encapsulates the well-known general principle of law, volenti non fit 
injuria.19 it seems correct to understand consent as an inherent right of each state, an 
aspect of its sovereignty. this right seems to be unaffected by the prohibition of force 
contained in Article 2(4) of the u.N. Charter. Neither does Article 2(4) prohibit force 
undertaken with the host state’s consent, nor can consensual intervention be regarded 
as an exception to the use of force. As James Crawford, while iLC special rapporteur, 
observed, consent acts as a constituent part of the primary rule and not as a secondary 
rule of state responsibility.20 Crawford opined that “some peremptory norms contain 
an ‘intrinsic’ consent element.”21 Naturally, this applies solely when a state consents 
to the use of force on its own territory.22 Conversely, a state cannot consent to the 
use of force against another state. this line of reasoning was present in the report 
of the international Law Association’s Committee on the use of Force. the report 
differentiated self-defense and the security Council authorizations as the so-called 
“excused violations” of state sovereignty, from the use of force in a foreign state upon 
its consent, which involves no violation of state sovereignty ab initio.23 Provided that 
consent is understood this way, the compatibility of consent-based interventions and 
Article 26 of dArs is not questionable.
1.2. An Ad Hoc Consent and a Treaty-Based Consent
when speaking of consent as a basis for intervention, an ad hoc consent, given in 
particular circumstances, is what first comes to mind. indeed, it is this kind of consent 
that most usually represents a ground for intervention. there is, however, a situation 
in which consent can be treaty-based, meaning that it is given in advance, when no 
18  Antonio tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict 19 (dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).
19  See théodore Christakis & karine Bannelier, Volenti non fit injuria ? Les effets du consentement 
à l’intervention militaire [Volenti Non Fit Iniuria? The Effects of Consent to Military Intervention], 50(1) 
Annuaire Français de droit international 102 (2004).
20  See Corten 2010, at 252.
21  Id.
22  Consent precludes wrongfulness vis-à-vis a consenting state, but the question is whether the wrong-
fulness is at the same time precluded vis-à-vis third states. According to one conceptual basis, consent 
cannot preclude wrongfulness vis-à-vis the international community, while according to another, 
the absence of coercion against the consenting state takes the intervention outside the scope of 
the prohibition of the use of force. in the latter case, not only would the interests and rights of the 
consenting state be safeguarded, but likewise the interests and rights of the third states, that is, the 
international community as a whole. tanca 1993, at 22.
23  Committee on the use of Force, international Law Association, report on Aggression and the use of 
Force, washington Conference (2014), B.4 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://ila.vettoreweb.com/storage/
download.aspx?dbstorageid=1057&storageFileGuid=1af35245-6705-48c1-be3d-4b099ea7ce60.
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situation requiring intervention yet exists. these treaties mostly include consent to the 
stationing of foreign troops in a state’s territory, or various arrangements of military 
cooperation among states.24 the scope of such consent depends on the conditions 
of a particular agreement.
Let us imagine a situation in which two states, A and B, conclude an agreement 
in which state A allows state B to station troops in state A’s territory. this scenario 
is quite possible and not particularly problematic. what would, however, happen 
if state B used state A’s territory in ways not provided for by the agreement? For 
example, where the presence of B’s troops is prolonged contrary to the terms of the 
agreement, or where they use force in A’s territory in a manner not envisaged by the 
agreement, or even where they use force against state A? Naturally, in such a situation 
the use of force against the host state would not be permitted. the General Assembly 
definition of Aggression has described such a scenario as an instance of aggression. 
it confirmed that actions which are contrary to what is stipulated in the agreements 
amount to aggression.25 thus, treaty-based consent cannot be considered as a blank 
authorization for any future military intervention. On the contrary, its validity must 
be strictly observed in light of the conditions stipulated in the agreement.26
some authors have reflected on a specific type of treaty-based consent, that 
given by the u.N. Charter to the security Council by all u.N. member states.27 
Member states agreed to confer the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security to the security Council28 and to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Council.29 this, inter alia, requires the obligation to accept 
Council decisions even if they include a coercive action towards a state. similar 
authorization is provided for in the Constitutive Act of the African union.30 Conferring 
such rights to organs of particular organizations can indeed be considered as giving 
24  See david wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62(2) university of Chicago Law 
review 607 (1995).
25  Article 3(e) provides that aggression is “the use of armed forces of one state which are within 
the territory of another state with the agreement of the receiving state, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond 
the termination of the agreement.” u.N. General Assembly, definition of Aggression, 14 december 
1974, A/res/29/3314.
26  For a different opinion see tom J. Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention in Enforcing Restraint: 
Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts 332 (L.F. damrosch (ed.), New york: Council on Foreign 
relations, 1993).
27  Christian henderson, The Use of Force and International Law 350 (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2018).
28  Art. 24(1) of the u.N. Charter.
29  Id. Art. 25.
30  Constitutive Act of the African union, Art. 4(h) (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://au.int/sites/default/
files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.
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a blank authorization for the use of force in certain circumstances. Any state, except 
the permanent members of the u.N., due to their right of veto, may be a subject of 
the u.N.’s coercive action. thus, this particular situation is an exceptional case, which 
confers a kind of a prior blank authorization for the use of force. Not a right conferred 
on a state, however, but on an international organization.
1.3. Validity of Consent
Article 20 of dArs speaks of “valid” consent. the Commentary to dArs refers to 
the validity requirement in terms that the consent must be “freely given and clearly 
established.”31 the Commentary further explains that it must be “actually expressed 
by the state rather than merely presumed on the basis that the state would have 
consented if it had been asked.”32 validity also requires the giving of consent by an agent 
or person who is authorized to do so on behalf of the state.33 Finally, consent may be 
given either in advance or at the time the conduct is occurring, while cases of consent 
given after the conduct has occurred are a form of waiver or acquiescence.34,35
1.3.1. Consent Must Precede the Intervention
Consent to an intervention may be given by a state in advance or even at the time 
an event is occurring, while ex post facto consent is a form of waiver or acquiescence, 
leading to the loss of the right to invoke responsibility.36 Attempts by some states 
to assert that retroactive consent might be appropriate in circumstances where an 
emergency situation required action in order to protect persons in another state 
from imminent and serious danger, have been inconclusive.
A discussion on the time frame for giving valid consent to intervention reflects 
a similar discussion on whether the security Council can authorize military actions by 
u.N. member states ex post facto. Legal scholars, as in the case of consent, generally 
agree that such authorizations must be given beforehand.37
examples of this were the soviet interventions in hungary and Afghanistan, the 
vietnamese invasion of kampuchea, and the ugandan intervention in the Congo. the 
soviet intervention in hungary that took place in 1956 was justified by the request of 
J. kadar, who came to power after the beginning of the intervention. the intervention 
31  dArs Commentaries, supra note 11, Commentary to Art. 20, para. 6.
32  Id.
33  Id. para. 4.
34  Id.
35  For a comparison of these conditions with the ones for a valid “request” in the idi resolution on 
Military Assistance on request see supra note 2.
36  dArs Commentaries, supra note 11, Commentary to Art. 20, para. 3.
37  See tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law 89 (Manchester: 
Manchester university Press, 2006); Corten 2010, at 348.
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was perceived as illegal and was not approved by the united Nations.38 when the 
soviet union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it did so without the prior consent of Prime 
Minister Amin. intervention resulted in the killing of Amin and the installing of the pro-
soviet kamin. kamin then issued the consent to intervention. however, such consent 
could not cancel the consequences of the unlawful act, even if it had been issued 
by a proper government of Afghanistan and not a puppet government.39 vietnam 
invaded kampuchea in 1978 to remove Pol Pot and the khmer rouge. intervention 
was justified by vietnam on humanitarian grounds, however vietnam invoked 
consent to justify its continued presence in kampuchean territory. the argument was 
considered groundless, since the consent was given by a government that came into 
power by means of vietnam’s intervention, which was not regarded by the majority of 
states as a legally constituted government.40 uganda justified its military intervention 
in the Congo by referring to the Lusaka Agreement from 1999. since its intervention 
had begun almost one year before the conclusion of the said Agreement, treaty-based 
consent could not be invoked as a valid justification for intervention.41
1.3.2. Express and Clear Consent
validity of consent has also been considered by examining the requirement 
that consent must be clear and express. Although it has been accepted that this 
presupposes the exclusion of presumed consent, it is not clear exactly in what way 
consent must be expressed. when special rapporteur, roberto Ago opined in his 
report to the iLC that consent, like all manifestations of the will of a state, can be 
expressed or tacit, as well as explicit or implicit, provided that it is clearly established.42 
he thus provided no conditions as far as the form of consent is concerned. Any form 
would be acceptable, then, if it derives from the circumstances of a particular case that 
consent indeed was given. Ago warns, on the other hand, that tacit consent should 
not be confused with presumed consent. the former is acceptable, the latter not. 
Presumed consent means that there is actually no consent at all, but it is presumed 
that the state in question would have consented had it been in a position to do so. 
Ago rejected the idea that such consent would be valid. he understandably found 
that, were such consent to be valid, cases of abuse would be all too common.43
38  tanca 1993, at 43.
39  ronzitti 1986, at 161.
40  Id. at 162.
41  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda) (2005) i.C.J. 168, para. 96.
42  roberto Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1979. Vol. II (Part One) 3, 35 (New york: united Nations, 1981) (Nov. 2, 2019), also available at http://
legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1979_v2_p1.pdf.
43  Id. at 36.
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Although in theory the permissibility of tacit consent and the impermissibility of 
presumed consent are not disputed, in practice it is not always easy to differentiate 
between the two. silence on the part of the host state has sometimes been interpreted 
as passive consent, as tolerance to a foreign military intervention, while in other 
situations it has been perceived as a lack of consent. the question then arises as to 
whether in such situations the principle of qui tacet consentire videtur can be applied. 
in certain areas of international law, this principle can no doubt be applied. it is, 
for instance, well-known that for customary law rule to be created, tacit consent or 
acquiescence will suffice, and no express consent to a particular conduct is required. in 
cases of the use of force, however, the situation is different. doubts about interpreting 
silence as consent seem justified. such interpretations might literally, as some authors 
suggest, “lead to chaos.”44
the form of consent was discussed by the iCJ in the Armed Activities case. the 
Court examined the consent given by the Congolese Government to the presence 
of ugandan troops in its territory. the Court found that uganda had been allowed 
by Congolese President kabila to engage in military action in the drC against anti-
ugandan rebels operating in the eastern part of the Congo. Before August 1998, the 
drC did not object to this. in April 1998, the two states signed a Protocol in which they 
agreed that their armies would “co-operate in order to ensure security and peace along 
the common border.”45 the dCr claimed before the Court that the said statement did 
not signify consent, that is, an invitation by either party to send its army into the other’s 
territory.46 the Court found that the Protocol could not form a legal basis for consent. 
the consent, on the contrary, predated the Protocol, and that prior consent could at 
any time be withdrawn by the Congolese Government, without any further formalities 
being necessary.47 in July 1998, Congolese President kabila issued a statement in which 
he announced the end of the mandate of the rwandan troops in Congolese territory.48 
Although he spoke of the rwandan army, not the ugandan army, in the last sentence 
he announced “the end of the presence of all foreign military forces in the Congo.”49 
the two states interpreted this announcement in different ways, uganda claiming that 
any withdrawal of consent for the presence of ugandan troops would have required 
a formal denunciation by the drC of the Protocol of April 1998.50 the Court found kabila’s 
statement ambiguous. however, regardless of the interpretation of the statement, the 
44  karine Bannelier-Christakis, Military Interventions Against ISIL in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and the Legal Basis 
of Consent, 29(3) Leiden Journal of international Law 743, 768 (2016).
45  Armed Activities case, supra note 41, para. 46.
46  Id.
47  Id. para. 47.
48  Id. para. 49.
49  Id.
50  Id. para. 50.
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Court found that consent by the drC to the presence of ugandan troops in its territory 
had been withdrawn at the latest in August 1998, when at the victoria Falls summit the 
drC accused uganda and rwanda of invading its territory.51
there have been divergent opinions among legal scholars on whether consent 
needs to be public. For example, O’Connell and Murphy have both examined the 
legality of u.s. drone strikes in Pakistan, and came to different conclusions regarding 
the existence and validity of consent by the Pakistani government. it is undisputed that 
there was no explicit and public consent. Murphy, however, alleges that the absence of 
public consent does not mean that there was no consent at all. he cites the washington 
Post, which noted that although Pakistan “formally protests such actions as a violation 
of its sovereignty, the Pakistani government has generally looked the other way when 
the CiA conducted Predator missions or us troops respond to cross-border attacks 
by the taliban.”52 Murphy maintains that there may have been internal documents or 
communications from the Pakistani government that clarified such consent, and that 
the Pakistani government’s knowledge of Predator drones being based in Pakistan 
and its knowledge that such aircraft were being used for missile strikes, presented 
a strong picture of tacit consent, so long as such knowledge could be established.53 
O’Connell, on the other hand, notes that “without express, public consent of the kind 
the us received from Afghanistan and iraq, Pakistan is in a position to claim the us is 
acting unlawfully, even bringing a future legal claim for compensation.”54 O’Connell 
claims that this would be true even if there were some sort of secret consent that the 
u.s. would have difficulty proving in a court or other public forum.55 the Pakistani 
government’s protests would, according to O’Connell, be a strong argument that it 
had withdrawn any implicit consent that might have been given.56
O’Connell has been criticized by some authors for advocating the “publicity” 
requirement, since “such a requirement is not present in any international legal 
documents, nor does it appear to be a requirement of customary international law.”57 
51  Armed Activities case, supra note 41, para. 53.
52  sean d. Murphy, The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan 
into Pakistan in The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis 109, 118 (M.N. schmitt (ed.), Newport: Naval 
war College, 2009).
53  Id. See also Olivia Flasch, The Legality of the Air Strikes Against ISIL in Syria: New Insights on the Extrate-
rritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, 37(3) Journal on the use of Force and international Law 
37, 42 (2016).
54  Mary e. O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, Notre dame Law school Legal studies research 
Paper No. 09-43, at 18 (July 2010) (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/
cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/OConnelldrones.pdf.
55  the case of the u.s. and Pakistan has been compared to that of the Congo and uganda, in which Congo 
gave express consent, while the Court found that even indirect signals are sufficient for the withdrawl 
of consent. Id.
56  Id.
57  Byrne 2016, at 105.
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indeed, although public consent is rather common in state practice,58 no rule of 
international law specifies publicity as a necessary requirement for valid consent. 
however, O’Connell merely pointed to the practical difficulty in ascertaining the 
existence of consent in situations where it has not been given publicly. By giving 
consent in a public form, confusion about whether the consent was tacit or presumed 
are avoided, and proving the existence of consent is considerably easier for the 
intervening state if consent is public. Advocating public consent does not mean that 
tacit consent, should it be established, would not be recognized as valid. however, if 
a host state is at all in a position to give public consent, such consent is preferable to 
tacit consent. the claim that the Pakistani government, although it formally protested, 
in fact approved of the u.s. intervention, may or may not be true. such consent might 
indeed have existed, however it needs to be proven rather than presumed.
Going back to Ago’s opinion, it can be concluded that consent may be given 
in different forms. express consent, preferably a public one, seems to be more 
appropriate since it is much easier to establish. this does not mean, however, that 
tacit consent would under no circumstances be valid. it is necessary to determine 
all the relevant circumstances to see whether a host state agreed to an outside 
intervention or not. Naturally, the chance of abuses, divergent interpretations and 
misunderstandings are much more likely where consent is tacit.
1.3.3. Consent Must Not Be Vitiated
Consent to an intervention must be freely given in order to be valid. if consent 
is vitiated, it produces no legal effects. Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, 
corruption or coercion. the iLC has confirmed this, pointing to the principles 
concerning the validity of consent to treaties.59 in that respect, the vienna Convention 
on the Law of treaties provides that error, fraud and corruption of a representative 
of a state may invalidate a state’s consent, while coercion upon a representative of 
a state or coercion on a state itself, committed by the threat or use of force, results 
in a treaty being without legal effect.60
the most frequently cited example is the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
where warsaw Pact countries relied on an appeal by dissident local authorities, 
“plainly under very intense pressure from Moscow.”61 the lawfulness of the operation 
was criticized for this reason.62
58  For example, the request of the king of Bahrain, hamad bin isa Al khalifa, to the GCC in 2011, yemeni 
President hadi’s request to the GCC to intervene in 2015 and iraq’s invitation to the united states in 
2014. henderson 2018, at 372.
59  Ago 1981, at 35–36; dArs Commentaries, supra note 11, at 73.
60  Arts. 51 and 52 of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties. For the text of the Convention see supra, 
note 12.
61  Corten 2010, at 270.
62  Id.
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the requirement of unvitiated consent guarantees that the will of a state, as 
expressed through consent, is true, and that its expression reflects the state’s genuine 
intention.
1.4. A Due Authority
One of the basic prerequisites for valid consent is that consent comes from an 
authorized entity. it is generally accepted that intervention by invitation is allowed 
on the side of the government, while it is prohibited on the side of the opposition. 
in a well-known statement in the Nicaragua case, the iCJ concluded:
…it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable 
at the request of the government of a state, were also to be allowed at the 
request of the opposition.63
in that particular case, the Court found that the u.s. aid to contras in recruiting, 
training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, 
supporting, aiding and directing military and paramilitary actions in and against 
Nicaragua, was a breach of the prohibition of the use of force.64 the Court repeated the 
same line of reasoning from the Nicaragua case in the case of Armed Activities, asserting 
that intervention is “allowable at the request of the government.”65 On the other hand, 
the General Assembly definition of Aggression has qualified aggression as the “sending 
by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry 
out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to amount to [the listed 
acts of aggression], or its substantial involvement therein,” confirming the prohibition of 
providing help to non-state actors fighting against the government.66 A similar provision 
can be found in another General Assembly resolution, namely the declaration on the 
inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic Affairs of states and the Protection of 
their independence and sovereignty. this declaration provides that
no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards a violent overthrow of the 
regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state.67
63  Nicaragua case, supra note 7, para. 246.
64  Id. para. 209.
65  Armed Activities case, supra note 41, paras. 42–53.
66  Art. 3(g) of the definition of Aggression. For the text see supra, note 25.
67  Para. 2 of the declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic Affairs of states and 
the Protection of their independence and sovereignty.
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the general rule on the permissibility of military intervention on the side of 
a government and its non-permissibility on the side of the opposition, may at first 
glance seem straightforward. in practice, however, there are many questions concerning 
the particular features of a government entitled to invite an intervention that need to 
be answered. For instance, who exactly is entitled to act on behalf of a government? 
what kind of government does it have to be in terms of democratic legitimacy? what 
kind of control over territory must it have in order to be considered legitimate?
1.4.1. An Entity Entitled to Act on Behalf of a Government
when speaking of who is entitled to invite outside intervention on behalf of 
a government, it is accepted that only the highest authorities of the state are able to 
issue such consent validly.68 On the contrary, local authorities, dissident authorities and 
diplomatic authorities are not entitled to do so,69 nor are the military and intelligent 
services.70 this rule is not applicable in all situations involving a state’s consent, but 
rather those involving military action. As stated in the Commentary of dArs, the 
question of who has the authority to consent to a departure from a particular rule 
may depend on the rule.71 the Commentary further asserts that
different officials or agencies may have authority in different contexts, in 
accordance with the arrangements made by each state and general principles 
of actual and ostensible authority.72
in order to properly identify the “highest state authorities,” the best option is most 
likely to refer to a state’s constitution. From the perspective of international law, it 
is not material which entities are empowered by a state’s internal act to represent 
such state at the highest level, as long as a state has such entities. it can generally be 
maintained that a president and a prime minister fall into this category. in practice, it 
will usually be one of these two to call for outside military assistance. A foreign minister 
could also be considered as one of the highest state authorities. these three officials 
have been specified by the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties as persons 
68  Corten 2010, at 259.
69  Id. at 263–266.
70  Committee on the use of Force, international Law Association, Final report on Aggression and the 
use of Force, sydney Conference (2018), at 19 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://www.ila-hq.org/
images/iLA/draftreports/draftreport_useOfForce.pdf.
71  “it is one thing to consent to a search of embassy premises, another to the establishment of a military 
base on the territory of a state.” dArs Commentaries, supra note 11, Commentary to Art. 20, para. 6. 
James Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1999. Vol. II (Part One) 3 (New york: united Nations, 2003), para. 237 (Nov. 2, 2019), also available at 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_498.pdf.
72  dArs Commentaries, supra note 11, Commentary to Art. 20, para. 6.
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representing a state by virtue of their function, and without having to produce full 
powers, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.73 
however, the vienna Convention need not necessarily be determinative of the issue 
at hand, given the above assertion that persons empowered in the domain of the 
law of the treaties need not be identical to persons empowered in respect of inviting 
foreign interventions. that said, it appears that the president, the prime minister and 
the foreign minister, in the practice of states, are indeed those who give consent 
to interventions. For example, President kabila granted consent for the presence 
of ugandan troops in the territory of the drC, the iraqi foreign minister requested 
intervention against isiL,74 while the interim president of the transitional government 
of Mali, traoré, requested French intervention.75 where invitations have been made 
by persons other than these three, they have been found to be unauthorized. such 
was the case with an invitation for foreign military assistance by the Governor-
General of Grenada. According to some sources, the Governor-General was a post 
without executive powers.76 According to others, the Governor-General was, under 
the Grenadian Constitution, the executive authority of Grenada, representing her 
Majesty’s Government.77 he was also the sole constitutional authority remaining in 
the country, and the only one who could issue a formal invitation for outside military 
help in restoring order in Grenada.78 even if the latter is true, and the Governor-General 
did have executive powers, it appears that those powers were not considered to 
be equivalent to those of a prime minister, and were not sufficient as far as giving 
consent is concerned. For this reason, the Governor-General was not perceived by 
the international community as a legitimate authority to invite an intervention, so 
the intervention was generally characterized as unlawful.
1.4.2. Legitimacy of Government
traditionally, in assessing criteria for international recognition, state practice 
and international legal doctrine have given primacy to the actual control that 
a government has over its people, and the territory of the state. in the pre-Charter era, 
democratic legitimacy played very little or no part at all. in the matter of recognition,79 
73  Art. 7(2)(a) of the vienna Convention on the Law of treaties. See supra, note 60.
74  Byrne 2016, at 117.
75  susanna d. wing, French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-Term Regional Presence?, 27(1) 
small wars & insurgencies 59 (2016).
76  Gray 2008, at 91.
77  Nabil hajjami, The Intervention of the United States and other States of Eastern Caribbean in Grenada – 
1983 in The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach 385, 393 (t. ruys et al. (eds.), 
Oxford; New york: Oxford university Press, 2018).
78  Id.
79  On recognition see stefan talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular 
Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford; New york: Oxford university Press, 2001).
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it was thus not material whether a government came to power by virtue of free and 
fair democratic elections, or in an unconstitutional way, such as by military coup. 
recognition depended on the establishment of effective control over the entire, 
or a significant part of, a territory.80 Legitimacy, as seen in terms of de facto control, 
was at that time confirmed in several arbitral decisions, most notably the Tinoco 
arbitration, where the tribunal concluded that the non-recognition of the Tinoco 
regime by Great Britain did not rebut the de facto existence of that regime.81 it was 
not required, however, that effective control be absolute. On the contrary, a minimum 
effective control was required, which meant that a government had not lost control 
of a sufficiently representative part of the state’s territory.82 On the other hand, 
phony governments, puppet regimes and governments in exile were excluded.83 the 
existence of effective control was not important per se, but as a means of proving that 
a government was accepted by the general population (at least presumably accepted) 
and that it had the power to represent that state in international relations.84
the system described above was characteristic of the period prior to the Cold war. the 
end of the Cold war was marked by a new tendency towards human rights observation 
and the development of “qualitative criteria on the questions of governance.”85 
democratic governance emerged as a new value.86 As a consequence, effective control 
was not an exclusive parameter in assessing the legitimacy of a government any more. 
what is more, it was considered that
the legitimacy of origin of a government can sometimes offset its lack of 
effectiveness.87
80  david wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7(1) duke 
Journal of Comparative & international Law 209, 220 (1996).
81  the Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica) (1923) 1 r.i.A.A. 369, 375.
82  Georg Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, Max Planck encyclopedia of Public international Law (January 
2010), para. 18 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/ 
law-9780199231690-e1702?prd=ePiL.
83  Id. For a different opinion see Julie d. Gagnon, ECOWAS’s Right to Intervene in Côte D’Ivoire to Install 
Alassane Ouattara as President-Elect, 3(1) Notre dame Journal of international & Comparative Law 
51, 67 (2013).
84  erica de wet, The Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation in Africa and its Implications for the 
Prohibition of the Use of Force, 26(4) european Journal of international Law 979б 984 (2016).
85  Fox 2015, at 817.
86  See, e.g., Democratic Governance and International Law (G.h. Fox & B.r. roth (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2000); thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86(1) American 
Journal of international Law 46 (1992); sean d. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of 
States and Governments, 48(3) international & Comparative Law Quarterly 545 (1999).
87  Jean d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38(4) New york university Journal 
of international Law and Politics 877, 908 (2006).
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in the 1990’s, the security Council demonstrated an unwillingness to recognize as 
legitimate those regimes which came to power in an unconstitutional way, and was 
more inclined to afford that status to those with democratic credentials. in the case 
of haiti in 1991, the democratically elected President Aristide was overthrown in the 
coup d’état only eight months after the elections took place. he was sent into exile, 
from where he requested outside military assistance to regain power. Although he 
no longer had effective control over his country, the security Council continued to 
recognize him as the legitimate representative of haiti88 and acting under Chapter vii 
of the u.N. Charter authorized “Member states to form a multinational force … and … 
to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from haiti of the military 
leadership … (and) the prompt return of the legitimately elected President…”89 
A similar situation occurred in sierra Leone in 1997, where the democratically elected 
President kabbah was overthrown in a military coup not even a year after he came 
to power. while in exile, kabbah requested Nigeria, who was chairing eCOwAs at 
the time, to intervene and “to put an end to [sierra Leoneans’] nightmare,” as well as 
“to enable them to recover their fundamental human rights.”90 eCOwAs conducted 
a successful intervention and kabbah was reinstalled as President. the security 
Council, for its part, firstly adopted a resolution on the imposition of sanctions on 
the junta members,91 and after the conducted intervention commended eCOwAs for 
its engagement in sierra Leone.92 it is often maintained that the security Council in 
that way provided an ex post facto authorization to the use of force.93 Another instance 
of eCOwAs intervention was the case of Côte d’ivoire in 2010, in which President 
Gbagbo refused to leave his post after losing the elections to the newly elected 
Ouattara. Although eCOwAs was asked to intervene by Ouattara, the security Council 
passed a resolution in which it authorized a peacekeeping mission stationed in Côte 
d’ivoire to “use all necessary means” to carry out its mandate to protect civilians.94 the 
most recent eCOwAs invited intervention occurred in 2017 in the Gambia, when the 
former President Jammeh refused to transfer power to the President-elect, Adama 
Barrow. the security Council adopted a resolution in which it expressed “support to 
eCOwAs in its commitment to ensure, by political means first, the respect of the will 
88  u.N. security Council, resolution 841 (1993), 16 June 1993, s/res/841 (1993).
89  u.N. security Council, resolution 940 (1994), 31 July 1994, s/res/940 (1994).
90  Lee F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine: The ECOWAS Intervention 
in Sierra Leone, 11(3) indiana international & Comparative Law review 605, 622 (2011).
91  u.N. security Council, resolution 1132 (1997), 8 October 1997, s/res/1132 (1997).
92  the situation in sierra Leone (s/Prst/1998/5), reliefweb, 26 February 1998 (Nov. 2, 2019), available 
at https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/situation-sierra-leone-sprst19985.
93  u.N. security Council, resolution 1132 (1997), supra note 91.
94  u.N. security Council, resolution 1975 (2011), 30 March 2011, s/res/1975 (2011).
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of the people of the Gambia.”95 in spite of the security Council’s instruction to use 
political means first, the same day the resolution was adopted, eCOwAs troops, under 
the lead of senegal, undertook a military intervention in the Gambia.96
in the above examples, the request for military intervention came from authorities 
which did not have effective control in the respective states. however, they received 
international support, including military assistance, for they were perceived as 
having democratic legitimacy, and thus represented entities authorized to request 
outside intervention. their status of authorized entities was confirmed by security 
Council resolutions.
the situation was somewhat different in the case of the ousted ukrainian President 
yanukovych, who requested russian military intervention in 2014. it was clear that 
yanukovych did not have effective control, but it was arguable that he enjoyed popular 
support. the security Council members disagreed on interpreting his status. the 
uk ambassador claimed that yanukovych was “a former leader who abandoned his 
office, his capital and his country” and that the new government was “overwhelmingly 
endorsed by the ukrainian Parliament.”97 the russian ambassador, on the other hand, 
claimed that yanukovych was “scared to leave kyiv,” implying that he still represented 
a legitimate President of ukraine.98
the legitimacy of a government, and consequently the appropriateness of an 
invitation to intervene, was also assessed in the case of syria. when Bashar al-Assad 
invited russian intervention in 2015, some voiced an argument that he was no 
longer empowered to do so, as he had lost popular support, and thus legitimacy.99 
On the other hand, the syrian Opposition Coalition gained recognition as “the 
legitimate representative of the people” by a large number of states, including three 
security Council permanent members – the u.s., the uk and France.100 however, such 
recognition was, according to some scholars, a political act and as such different from 
95  u.N. security Council, resolution 2337 (2017), 19 January 2017, s/res/2337 (2017).
96  See Claus kreß & Benjamin Nußberger, Pro-Democratic Intervention in Current International Law: The Case 
of The Gambia in January 2017, 4(2) Journal on the use of Force and international Law 239 (2017).
97  s/Pv.7125, security Council 7125th meeting, 3 March 2014.
98  Id.
99  Marc weller in an interview to the huffington Post. See Nick robins-early, Russia Says its Airstrikes in Syria 
Are Perfectly Legal. Are They?: An Expert on International Law Explains Why Russia’s Argument Doesn’t Hold 





100  “Friends of syria” recognise Opposition: Over 100 Nations Meeting in Morocco Officially recognise 
Opposition Coalition as “Legitimate representative” of syria, Al Jazeera, 12 december 2012 (Nov. 2, 2019), 
available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212124541767116.html.
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recognition in a legal sense.101 if this view is accepted, it could then be maintained 
that such political recognition does not challenge the legitimacy of the Assad 
government, which remains the representative of syria, despite its possible loss 
of legitimacy.102 in addition, Assad seemed to have retained effective control over 
large parts of the country, including the capital, while none of the opposition groups 
exercised effective control to a similar degree.103
At the time of writing of this paper (June 2019), the issue of concurring authorities 
exists in the conflict in venezuela. the self-proclaimed interim President Guaidó is 
challenging the current President Maduro, who had been re-elected in presidential 
elections held in 2018. the united states have renounced the legitimacy of Maduro, 
recognizing Guaidó as an interim President. russia and China oppose such 
recognition, condemning the united states for interfering in the internal affairs of 
venezuela. there has not been any foreign military intervention in the venezuelan 
crisis yet, however American President trump has clearly stated that a military 
intervention has not been ruled out.104
As seen from the examples above, state practice is still inconclusive with respect to 
criteria for determining the due authority to invite outside intervention. A traditional 
effective control standard is still being applied, however it is not an exclusive criterion. 
democratic legitimacy has started to play an important role in assessing which side 
to the conflict is entitled to request military assistance. such legitimacy is, however, 
sometimes difficult to establish.
2. Interventions by Invitation in Civil Wars
invitations to intervention may occur in various situations. Often in the case 
of domestic unrest. sometimes it will be a conflict with terrorist groups operating 
in a state’s territory. in certain situations, an invitation will take place in a civil war. 
will an intervention then be permissible, provided it is undertaken on behalf of 
a government?
when a conflict within a country reaches the threshold of civil war, the qualities 
of a government competent to make a valid intervention come into question. if 
a government has lost control over a certain part of a territory, and becomes one 
101  stefan talmon, Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People, 12(2) 
Chinese Journal of international Law 219 (2013); Laura visser, Russia’s Intervention in Syria, eJiL: Talk!, 25 
November 2015 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-intervention-in-syria/.
102  Bannelier-Christakis 2016, at 763.
103  visser, supra note 101.
104  suzanne Lynch, Trump Won’t Rule out Military Intervention in Venezuela: US President Praises Brazilian 




of two or more factions fighting for power within a country, then its legitimacy to 
invite an intervention becomes questionable. it is quite a common situation that 
multiple parties in an internal conflict claim to have legitimacy in representing the 
state. One party to a conflict may be democratically elected, while another may claim 
to enjoy the support of the majority of the population. in such cases of concurrent 
governments, the question of determining the due authority arises. we have dealt 
with the question of legitimacy earlier on. But apart from determining the due 
authority, another question remains – whether intervening in a civil war, as a matter 
of principle, has a legal basis in international law.
According to the so-called “negative equality” principle, a new doctrine proposed 
in the report of the independent international Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict 
in Georgia, a foreign military intervention in the case of a civil war is impermissible, 
either on the side of an “old” government or on the side of the rebels.105 the underlying 
purpose of this doctrine is to prevent outside interference in determining the future 
of a country in a civil war, safeguarding thus both the non-intervention principle, as 
well as the principle of self-determination.106 the idea is that
where a society is fully divided about its political future, meaning that 
the government cannot plausibly claim to represent the entire population, 
external assistance on the government’s behalf would interfere with the 
people’s right to determine their own future.107
while the rationale behind the negative equality principle is understandable, it 
raises some questions, such as the appropriateness of not reacting to internal conflicts 
where civilians might be, and in practice are, subject to suffering and violations of 
human rights. it is this aspect of internal conflicts that has caused a shift in the 
perception of these conflicts as purely domestic issues. the trend of internationalizing 
internal conflicts thus started with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocol i, and continued with the security Council recognizing internal 
conflicts as threats to international peace and security.108 Additionally, attempts to 
legally justify humanitarian interventions, including by endorsing the responsibility 
to Protect doctrine, aim at changing the paradigm according to which internal 
105  report of the independent international Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. ii 
(september 2009), at 227 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/iiFFMCG_volume_
ii1.pdf.
106  Id.
107  Fox 2015, at 827.
108  See some of the recent security Council resolutions: s/res/2441 (2018) on the situation in Libya; 
s/res/2443 (2018) on Bosnia and herzegovina; s/res/2444 (2018) on the situation in somalia; 
s/res/2454 (2019) on the situation in the Central African republic; s/res/2463 (2019) on the situation 
in the dr Congo.
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conflicts are excluded from outside military interference. Naturally, interventions 
by invitation cover a wide spectrum of situations, and are mostly not motivated by 
humanitarian reasons. however, an absolute prohibition of interventions in internal 
conflicts would inevitably have consequences on the humanitarian aspects of those 
conflicts as well.
Nonetheless, the negative equality principle should not be taken as an absolute 
principle, for it “has not yet attracted a consensus among legal scholars and indeed 
remains controversial.”109 state practice shows that interventions in conflicts that 
might qualify as internal do occur, although it must be stressed that sometimes it 
is difficult to determine whether the conflict has reached the threshold of a civil 
war. this question arose in case of the French military intervention in Mali in 2013, 
which was conducted upon the request by the government of Mali. the aim of the 
operation was to suppress terrorists operating in Mali. French intervention was 
perceived as a response to a valid request by the government of Mali. its legality 
was not questioned. On the contrary, many states, regional organizations and the 
united Nations supported the intervention.110 in its resolution 2100, the security 
Council expressly welcomed “the swift action by the French forces, at the request 
of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist 
and armed groups.”111 it seems, though, as if the aspect of terrorism in case of Mali 
excluded the possibility of the conflict being an internal one. however, it must be 
borne in mind that terrorism is a method, and may be employed by different actors, 
including rebels that participate in an internal conflict. the fact is that prior to the 
French intervention, a significant part of the country was controlled by rebels.112 
Newspapers reported that Mali’s government had lost control over the northern half 
of the country, which is the size of France.113 to illustrate the gravity of the situation 
in Mali at the time, the words of the Malian representative during his address to the 
security Council may be recalled. he said that a state of emergency was imposed 
throughout the country, as well as an appeal for general mobilization.114 he also 
109  Fox 2015, at 828. See also dapo Akande & Zachary vermeer, The Airstrikes Against Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Alleged Prohibition on Military Assistance to Governments in Civil Wars, eJiL: Talk!, 2 February 
2015 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-
and-the-alleged-prohibition-on-military-assistance-to-governments-in-civil-wars/.
110  karine Bannelier & théodore Christakis, Under the UN Security Council’s Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention 
by Invitation in the Malian Conflict, 26(4) Leiden Journal of international Law 855, 857 (2013).
111  u.N. security Council, resolution 2100 (2013), 25 April 2013, s/res/2100 (2013).
112  Mali Crisis: key Players, BBC News, 12 March 2013 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-17582909.
113  rebels Capture Mali Government troops: twelve Government soldiers Captured raising Fears of 
rebel Advance towards Government-held territory in the south, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2013 (Nov. 2, 
2019), available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/2013181147990618.html.
114  u.N. security Council, 6905th meeting, s/Pv.6905, 22 January 2013.
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expressed gratitude to France for promptly providing assistance to Mali, thus “making 
it possible to save Mali as a state.”115 yet, in spite of the fact that Mali was evidently 
controlled by different groups and the outcome of internal fighting was insecure, 
the international community did not hesitate to take the government’s side. the 
case of Mali is not alone in this. in some other conflicts, such as those in syria, the 
drC, and yemen, there have been foreign interventions upon the government’s 
request, although it appears that the conflicts in these states had, at least at certain 
moments, reached the threshold of a civil war.
the case of Mali sheds light on another issue, the so-called “purpose-based 
approach” in assessing the permissibility of intervening in civil wars. According to 
the principle, if the purpose of consensual intervention is, for instance, “a fight against 
terrorism; a fight against rebels who use the territory of the neighboring state as ‘safe-
haven’ to launch attacks against the intervening state; the protection of nationals 
abroad; the liberation of hostages; the protection of crucial infrastructure; the joint 
fight against drug smugglers and other criminals, and more generally, support to 
the government to maintain law and order and the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations,” then intervention in a civil war is legal.116
the purpose-based approach is problematic for at least two reasons. the first 
difficulty relates to determining whether a particular purpose of intervention falls 
within acceptable purposes as stated. For instance, if the purpose for intervention is 
to fight terrorism, the question is who should determine, and how, whether an act is 
indeed a terrorist one.117 in certain cases, the practice of states and/or international 
organizations will provide an answer to this question. For instance, in the case 
of Mali or iraq, the u.N. security Council characterized certain opposition groups 
as terrorists.118 in other cases, such characterization can be subject to different 
interpretations, given the fact that there is no universally accepted definition 
of terrorism, while governments consenting to an intervention are inclined to 
characterize all opposition forces as terrorists.119
Another problem with the purpose-based approach is establishing whether the 
proclaimed purpose of intervention represents anything more than a motive for the 
intervening state, which in itself is not sufficient to legitimize an intervention. each 
time a state undertakes a military intervention in another state, it stipulates one or 
more of its motives for such intervention. however, such motives or reasons should 
115  u.N. security Council, 6905th meeting, s/Pv.6905, 22 January 2013.
116  Bannelier-Christakis 2016, at 747.
117  Id.
118  See u.N. security Council, resolution 2100 (2013), supra note 111; u.N. security Council, resolution 
2169 (2014), 30 July 2014, s/res/2169 (2014).
119  Bannelier-Christakis 2016, at 747.
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be differentiated from legal justifications for intervention.120 Motives can, naturally, 
correspond to legal justifications, but this is not necessarily so.
when discussing the permissibility of intervention in internal conflicts, another 
question arises – whether such an intervention on the side of a government can be 
justified as a response to a prior outside intervention on the side of the opposition. 
such a situation clearly has to be differentiated from collective self-defense, as the 
latter includes the existence of an unlawful armed attack in terms of Article 51 of the 
u.N. Charter, while the former necessarily does not. in this scenario, the conflict ceases 
to be exclusively of an internal nature, as the involvement of international players 
internationalizes it.121 For instance, when saudi Arabia intervened in yemen in 2015, 
it justified its intervention by referring to the prior intervention by iran on the side 
of the yemeni rebels, the houthi. in situations like these, it is often the case that the 
intervening states’ involvement in the internal conflict is less motivated by helping 
one side to the conflict, and more by protecting its own interests, often with respect 
to the other intervening state.122 Apart from the fact that counter-interventions are 
prone to abuse (but so are other modalities of the use of force), it is not clear – either 
from state practice or from international jurisprudence – what degree of prior outside 
intervention gives rise to counter-intervention, nor whether a minimum degree of 
proportionality must exist between two foreign interventions.123
Another debatable feature of counter-intervention is how it relates to the self-
determination principle. if the rationale of the negative equality principle, according 
to which intervention in a civil war is prohibited, is not to hamper the exercise of the 
right to self-determination, the same logic should apply to assessing the permissibility 
of counter-intervention. however, some argue that, to the contrary, “counter-
intervention should be about undoing the impact of the original intervention on the 
side of the rebel groups” and that “it should be about evening the odds, not tilting the 
balance in favor of the de jure authorities.”124 it is questionable whether this holds true, 
as foreign interventions complicate and may even further fuel an internal conflict. 
Counter-intervention is, thus, undeniably permitted if it constitutes collective self-
defense against the prior intervention, which has reached the threshold of an armed 
attack. however, in such case, the legal basis for the use of force is self-defense, and 
the argument of counter-intervention becomes redundant.
120  Akande & vermeer, supra note 109.
121  See Fox 2015, at 820.
122  See Glen Carey & sarah Algethami, How the Saudis Turned the Yemen War into a Humanitarian Crisis, the 
washington Post, 14 december 2018 (Nov. 2, 2019), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/how-the-saudis-turned-the-yemen-war-into-a-humanitarian-crisis/2018/12/14/9a8b6fce-
ffb6-11e8-a17e-162b712e8fc2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5e7d01a61238.
123  tom ruys & Luca Ferro, Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-Led Military 
Intervention in Yemen, 65(1) international & Comparative Law Quarterly 61, 93 (2016).
124  Id. at 94.
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Conclusion
in international legal doctrine, as well as in state practice, interventions by invitation 
are perceived as permissible. it is commonly accepted that these interventions, 
although they include the use of force, fall outside of the ambit of Article 2(4) of the 
u.N. Charter, which prohibits the use of force. According to the principle volenti non 
fit injuria, a state’s political independence and territorial integrity are not violated by 
an action to which that state consents.
in spite of their general permissibility, the majority of interventions by invitation 
that occur in practice are of dubious legality. this is due to the fact that the validity 
of consent has been challenged in these particular circumstances. it has either been 
maintained that consent has been given by an authority not empowered to give it; or 
that consent was presumed rather than actually given; or that some other requirement 
for valid consent was lacking.
in addition, the possibility of intervening in civil wars remains a highly disputed 
issue. the traditional standard from the Nicaragua case, according to which an 
intervention is allowed on the side of a government, while it is prohibited on the side 
of the opposition, seems to apply only if a conflict has not reached a threshold of a civil 
war. if, however, it has evolved into civil war, the negative equality principle should 
apply, and third states should abstain from interfering, thus allowing the realization of 
the principle of self-determination. this traditional understanding seems, however, to 
be under scrutiny nowadays. interventions by invitation do take place even in conflicts 
which are believed to have reached the threshold of a civil war. what is surprising, 
though, is that their legality has not been challenged by the international community. 
Moreover, governments seem to have lost the prerogative of inviting an intervention 
unless they possess certain qualities. recent practice shows that third states were 
inclined to support opposition groups rather than governments in particular conflicts, 
especially if those governments were said to be hostile to their own population. these 
developments may lead to the erosion of the Nicaragua principle on the prohibition 
of intervention on the side of the opposition, on one hand, and also to the changing 
of the traditional paradigm of non-intervention in internal conflicts on the other. such 
a scenario would further complicate the situation, as it would significantly broaden 
the spectrum of situations in which third states may intervene in internal conflicts. 
it is questionable what would remain of the non-intervention principle should such 
a scenario materialize.
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